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THE GROUNDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Brian Slattery*
14 May 2021†
What is the rational foundation for the doctrine of universal human rights? Some
philosophers, such as Alan Gewirth, argue that it may be discovered simply by
reflection on certain essential features of the human constitution. However this
approach has significant problems, achieving its ends by smuggling certain tacit
premises into the argument. A better approach is one that appeals to the communal
practices and traditions within which doctrines of human rights have evolved
historically. It is here that Alasdair MacIntyre's work becomes relevant, because
it maintains that traditions have a rationality of their own, and that all rationality
is in some sense traditional. That MacIntyre himself has used these ideas to dismiss
the doctrine of universal human rights only shows the extent to which MacIntyre
(like many others) has misunderstood the true character of that doctrine.

Introduction
Robert Coles tells the story of a boy he met while working in the
American South with black and white children involved in the
conflicts over the integration of white schools. 1 The boy was just
fourteen years old – a white from a 'redneck' background, a tough
athlete, and a poor student. He was initially against any blacks
coming to his school. However, one day he had a strange experience.
Here is the boy's story in his own words, followed by some
comments by Coles:
‘I didn't want any part of them here. They belong with their
own, and we belong with our own – that's what we all said.
Then those two kids came here, and they had a tough time.
*

Emeritus Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
This is a revised version of an article entitled “Rights, Communities, and
Traditions”, which first appeared in (1991) 41 University of Toronto Law Journal
447-67. I have clarified and recast some of the arguments but the basic structure
of the original piece remains intact. I am indebted to Professors Hans Mohr and
Kent McNeil for their comments on an earlier draft.
1
The Moral Life of Children (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press 1986) 27-29. The
racial slurs found in the original passage have been abridged.
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They were all by themselves. The school had to get police
protection for them. We didn't want them and they knew it.
But we told them so, in case they were slow to get the
message. I didn't hold back, no more than anyone else. I said,
"Go, n-----, go," with all the others. I meant it. But after a few
weeks, I began to see a kid, not a n----- – a guy who knew
how to smile when it was rough going, and who walked
straight and tall, and was polite. I told my parents, "It's a real
shame that someone like him has to pay for the trouble
caused by all those federal judges."
Then it happened. I saw a few people cuss at him. "The dirty
n-----," they kept on calling him, and soon they were pushing
him in a corner, and it looked like trouble, bad trouble. I went
over and broke it up. I said, "Hey, cut it out." They all looked
at me as if I was crazy, my white buddies and the n-----, too.
But my buddies stopped, and the n----- left. Before he left,
though, I spoke to him. I didn't mean to, actually! It just came
out of my mouth. I was surprised to hear the words myself:
"I'm sorry." As soon as he was gone, my friend gave it to me:
"What do you mean, 'I'm sorry'!" I didn't know what to say. I
was as silent as the n----- they stopped. After a few minutes,
we went to basketball practice. That was the strangest
moment of my life.'
His life had, in fact, changed [comments Robert Coles]. In no
time, it seemed, he was beginning to talk more consciously
(more self-consciously, actually) to the black youth. Soon, he
was championing him personally, while still decrying
'integration.' Finally, he would become a friend of the black
youth's and advocate 'an end to the whole lousy business of
segregation.' Meanwhile, it was for me to explain that shift –
in an ordinary, fourteen-year-old boy just starting high
school; a boy who, by the way, had to endure lots of scorn
himself from the many others who were not as swift as he to
show a change in racial attitudes. Press and press that youth,
and what does one find? He told me: 'I'd be as I was, I guess,
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but for being there in school that year and seeing that kid –
seeing him behave himself, no matter what we called him,
and seeing him being insulted so bad, so real bad. Something
in me just drew the line, and something in me began to
change, I think.'
A striking feature of this story is the fact that the white youth – let us
call him Jim – was moved to do something that seemed inexplicable
to him at the time, and that went against his basic convictions and
those of his friends. Not that his move to defend the black youth –
let us call him Martin – came totally out of the blue. Clearly Jim had
been pondering the troubles at his school and discussing them with
his parents and friends. And he had already observed it was a shame
that Martin should have to suffer for troubles stirred up by others.
But his decision to intervene apparently did not flow from any
dramatic change in his earlier views about the rights of blacks in
general.
To the contrary, Jim seems to have acted on the spur of the moment,
in response to a particular set of facts. Only later did he work out the
broader implications of his actions, and then in stages. At first he
restricted himself to championing the cause of one particular black
student, while still supporting racial segregation. But later he began
calling for an end to the 'whole lousy business.' His decision to
intervene became for Jim an occasion of moral insight, with
ramifications extending far beyond what he consciously realized at
the time.
Jim originally denied any ties of community with blacks: 'I didn't
want any part of them here. They belong with their own, and we
belong with our own – that's what we all said.' This rejection of
communal bonds released Jim and his friends from normal social
constraints, so that they felt free to insult the black students, to corner
them and beat them up, with the aim of driving them from the school.
What made Jim change was his spontaneous empathy with Martin,
his identification with him as a human being: 'But after a few weeks,
I began to see a kid, not a n----- – a guy who knew how to smile
when it was rough going, and who walked straight and tall, and was
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polite.' In a sense, Martin demonstrated by his actions and manner
the validity of the moral point he was making. He displayed qualities
of courage and grace that Jim, despite himself, could not help
admiring – qualities that were recognized as virtues in Jim's own
circle. So, Jim's empathy with Martin was not simply a spontaneous
act of personal insight; it had a strong basis in existing communal
standards by which moral status and personhood were defined.
This feeling of empathy prompted Jim to defend Martin and,
unexpectedly, to blurt out, 'I'm sorry.' Jim's buddy was quick to
realize the significance of the apology, quicker, it seems, than Jim
himself. You only apologize to someone you have wronged; but you
cannot wrong someone to whom you owe nothing. From a
spontaneous feeling of empathy there flowed a tacit recognition of
communal bonds. And Jim's identification with Martin did not
remain just at a personal level; eventually it led him to accept the
justice of blacks' demands to be treated as full members of the
community, with the rights that membership entailed. Martin stood
in for the group to which he belonged. To accept Martin as a friend
and fellow student was in the end to recognize blacks as fellow
citizens. So, not only are basic rights grounded in the recognition of
community, they also have a communal aspect, spreading out from
the individual to the group.
Jim and Martin did not act in a vacuum, of course, but in a particular
social and historical context. Martin was being persecuted, not for
any individual attributes, but because he belonged to an excluded
group, with a history rooted in slavery, segregation, and
discrimination. And Jim originally joined in persecuting him, not for
personal reasons, but to defend the interests of the white community.
Society had assigned definite roles for people like Jim and Martin to
play. The interest of the drama lies in the fact that the actors
ultimately refused to play their allotted roles. Martin defied the racial
barriers surrounding white schools, and Jim, put to the test, could not
stomach the sanctions supporting those barriers.
To enlarge a little on this point, Martin came to the school, not just
on his own initiative, but as a participant in a broadly-based social
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and political movement, in which black demands for equality and
basic rights were concretely manifested in the actions of a wide
variety of individuals, groups, officials, and institutions. These
ranged from the black students actually 'integrating' the schools, to
various civil rights organizations, to the judges of the federal courts.
The latter in turn acted in a context of well-established judicial
practices and doctrines, stemming in part from the American Bill of
Rights but also from certain ancient traditions of the common law.
In a parallel way, Jim's act of intervention, although revolutionary
for a person of his upbringing and social situation, followed a path
prepared for him in advance. It was presented to him as a concrete
possibility only because of the acts of innumerable other people,
representing years of agitation, organization, debate, theorizing, and
litigation. Jim's individual act of conscience had strong social
dimensions; it responded to an opportunity made ready by an
ongoing social movement.
Indeed, the conflict as a whole took a form largely moulded by
existing social practices. Martin's goal was not just to establish an
abstract point about black rights but more concretely to obtain the
full benefits of an existing social institution – the public school
system – which were being denied to him and his fellows. The matter
in dispute was defined by a broad range of social arrangements
already in place, whereby a certain level of education was provided
at public expense to children – the question being the manner in
which it was to be provided. What was at root a general issue of
human rights assumed a very particular shape due to the local social
and political environment.
We have emphasized the social and historical dimensions of the
incident recounted by Coles. A possible implication of this approach
now needs to be considered. Coles tacitly presents Jim's story as one
in which a teenage boy transcends his personal beliefs and the moral
code of his community. Yet, it could be argued, this theme is
fundamentally misleading. For there is another side to the drama that
needs to be considered, one that Coles does not emphasize. It is the
story of Jim's white friends, who were dumbfounded by what Jim did
and presumably kept on harassing the black students. In comparing
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their actions with Jim's, can we see any real difference? In each case,
it could be said, the boys acted out of a particular mix of the moral
code inculcated by their families and communities, broader social
influences, and their individual personalities and sympathies. Of
course, we may happen to think that Jim's stance was 'better' than
that of his friends. However, that is just a matter of subjective
preference. Objectively, there is no basis for distinguishing between
the two, for in matters of morality there can be no objectivity.
This seems to me a hard lesson to learn. If Coles's story has any
meaning, it is one that speaks of the possibility of moral
transcendence, albeit a possibility that is both fragile and oddly
dependent on chance and circumstance. For the story draws its force
from the implication that Jim moved to a position more in tune with
some sort of ultimate moral reality. Whatever form that reality might
take (and the story is silent on this point), it clearly has a transcendent
quality, in rising beyond the racist moral code of Jim's community
and also Jim's personal dispositions. I suspect that most readers, like
myself, will be attracted by the underlying theme of Coles's story,
even if we are puzzled by the notion of an ultimate moral reality or
have difficulty in reconciling it with the obvious connections
between a person's moral beliefs and social forces.
But if Jim's insight was in some way attuned to an ultimate moral
reality, it was, as we have already emphasized, an insight into a
concrete situation, the dimensions of which were shaped by existing
practices. Moreover, Jim's intervention was prompted by the
conviction that Martin deserved to be treated like any other student.
Jim simply extended the existing standards of his community to
someone previously viewed as an outsider. The equal treatment to
be meted out to Martin was implicit in the body of practice Jim
already accepted as a just or ‘normal’ way of treating other members
of the community. So, the ultimate moral reality towards which Jim
was groping was partially immanent in existing communal practices
and standards.
Coles's story, then, suggests a number of interesting points about the
character and origins of human rights. Let me try to summarize them.
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Human rights doctrines, although often couched in highly abstract
terms, are rooted in concrete moral insights into our relations with
others. In particular, they draw on our ability to empathize with other
people, including those who may traditionally have been viewed as
alien or unworthy. So, human rights doctrines are essentially otherdirected. They are concerned with what we owe to others by reason
of the fact that they are human. Yet, in practice, the recognition of
basic rights in others is closely connected with accepting them as
members of a community. Human rights do not precede communal
ties, they presuppose them. By the same token, while human rights
are vested in individuals, they often relate to aspects or dimensions
of individuals that stem from their membership in socially defined
groups. In vindicating the rights of the individual, we vindicate the
rights of the group. Such acts do not occur in a historical vacuum.
They are the product of a lengthy evolutionary process involving the
development of practices of tolerance and cooperation between
different societies and groups, gradually supplanting practices of
intolerance and domination. Despite these deep historical roots,
human rights doctrines have a revolutionary potential, a potential
that lies largely in their claim to be attuned to an ultimate moral
reality.
These points cluster around four main themes: (1) the important role
played by concrete acts of empathy and insight in the evolution of
human rights doctrines; (2) the communal aspects of such doctrines,
in both their underpinnings and practical implications; (3) the
complex interplay between, on the one hand, established social
practices and, on the other, human rights movements as historically
rooted, socially embodied forces for change; and (4) the paradoxical
fact that human rights are immanent in social practice and yet speak
clearly of transcendence. In short, we have portrayed human rights
as concrete, communal, historically grounded, and transcendent.
The picture contrasts with the view that human rights flow from
highly abstract doctrines that focus on the individual in isolation
from the community. According to this view, individuals come to
society already holding inalienable rights. These rights limit the
claims that society may make on individuals and control the shape
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that a community may assume. Human rights are grasped by a
process of reflection that prescinds from history and social practice
and carries universal force by virtue of its inherent rationality. On
this view, then, human rights are abstract, individual, ahistorical, and
rationally based.
This contrasting viewpoint, I think, fails to attend sufficiently to the
way in which human rights doctrines have actually arisen and gained
acceptance in practice. It ignores the historical realities of human
rights movements – movements to achieve religious tolerance;
abolish slavery; improve conditions in prisons; dismantle colonial
empires; broaden the franchise; provide social services; gain full
political and social rights for blacks, indigenous peoples, and
women; and so on. Our brief discussion of Coles's story suggests
how this sort of historical analysis might proceed and the kind of
conclusions likely to be drawn.
But the exercise, even if it succeeds in presenting a credible
alternative to the rationalist approach, cannot directly counter the
latter's appeal, which lies, not in any pretence of historical verity, but
in an assertion of inherent rationality – the claim to provide an
ahistorical account of the grounds of human rights. So, we need to
confront this view more directly.
We will start with the writings of Alan Gewirth, a modern exemplar
of the rationalist approach. In a series of carefully argued works,
notably Reason and Morality,2 Gewirth has maintained that human
rights have a purely rational foundation which is discoverable simply
by reflection and gives them universal force. We will then turn to the
contrasting views of Alasdair MacIntyre, who in such works as After
Virtue 3 and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 4 has claimed that
human rights doctrines are bogus. They are the convenient fictions
2

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1978). See also his collection Human
Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press 1982) (hereafter Human Rights).
3
2d ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press 1984).
4
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press 1988) (hereafter Whose
Justice?).
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of modern individualistic societies, which assume that the common
good is nothing but the sum of our individual preferences, while
repudiating history and tradition as grounds for moral reasoning. In
reality, maintains MacIntyre, our ideas about justice are necessarily
grounded in the standards and practices of particular societies and
schools of rational enquiry. There are no neutral standards of
rationality available to provide a foundation for universal human
rights.
Rights and rationality
What basic obligations do you owe to other people simply by reason
of the fact that they are human? Alan Gewirth argues that the answer
may be discovered just by reflecting on your own make-up. From
some essential features of your own constitution you may deduce
what basic obligations you owe to others with the same constitution,
and so what basic rights they possess.
At first glance this approach seems to attempt the impossible. How
may obligations to others be logically deduced from one's own
personal characteristics without covertly introducing premises that
bridge the gap between the self and others? The project has the same
quirky appeal as an effort to build a perpetual motion machine: we
suspect at heart that it can't be done, but we're fascinated by the
attempt to do it.
Gewirth's argument, in brief, runs as follows.5 As a rational person
you are bound to accept the proposition, 'My freedom and well-being
are necessary goods,' because these goods are the essential
prerequisites of action of any kind. No matter what you want to do,
you must have a certain basic level of freedom and well-being in
order to be able to do it. Gewirth calls freedom and well-being
'generic goods' because they characterize the entire range of possible
actions.

5

See especially Reason and Morality, supra note 2, chapter 2, and Human Rights,
supra note 2, essay 1.
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If you reflect further on the necessary connection between generic
goods and action you will necessarily accept a second proposition:
'All other persons must at least refrain from removing or interfering
with my freedom and well-being.' This proposition follows logically
from the first because, from your own perspective, you cannot
achieve any of your objectives unless others respect the essential
preconditions of action on your part. So you are logically obliged to
claim that they respect your generic goods.
This claim in turn requires you to assert a third proposition: 'I have
rights to freedom and well-being.' This proposition is logically
entailed by the second proposition, because to deny it would be to
accept that other people may interfere with your freedom and wellbeing, which you cannot accept because these goods are the
fundamental goods of action.
Having come this far, argues Gewirth, you must also accept that all
other beings with the capacity for rational action have the same
rights to freedom and well-being. If your ability to engage in rational
action warrants your assertion of rights to generic goods, the same
holds true for all others with the same ability. Since the capacity for
rational action is common to the whole of humanity, you are
logically committed to accepting universal human rights to freedom
and well-being.
An argument of this kind is open to two sorts of challenges. The first
tries to show that the argument fails on its own terms, that its
conclusions do not follow inexorably from its premises, or that the
premises themselves are open to doubt. A second, related challenge
attempts to undermine the universal force claimed for the argument
by showing that it is rooted in conceptions particular to modern
Euro-American culture. Both sorts of criticisms are advanced by
Alasdair MacIntyre in his discussion of Gewirth. Although not of
equal strength, the criticisms neatly define the range of issues
separating the two camps.
MacIntyre first tackles the argument on its own terms. According to
Gewirth, someone who holds that freedom and well-being are
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necessary goods is logically committed to claiming a right to those
goods. But, observes MacIntyre, introducing the concept of a right
at this point needs justification. To claim that I have a right to
something goes beyond merely asserting that I need it, because it
entails that others should refrain from interfering with whatever I
have a right to. Yet this conclusion does not follow from the simple
assertion of a need, no matter how basic or urgent the need may be.
So it is wrong to think that the assertion of a right is logically entailed
by the assertion of a need. 6
However, Gewirth is not so easily dispatched; he has a plausible
reply at hand. Of course, he says, just because someone needs
something does not mean they have a right to it, since the latter posits
duties on others which the first does not. But the situation changes
when you move from an external to an internal perspective, from
statements about others to statements about yourself. When you
assert that you need certain goods as the necessary grounds of action,
you are logically committed to asserting that others must respect
those goods and (what amounts to the same thing) that you are
entitled to them. The logical gap between assertions of needs and
assertions of rights vanishes when you are speaking of your own
essential requirements. The recognition that you must have certain
goods in order to be able to engage in action compels you to claim
that others must respect those goods. 7
How convincing is Gewirth's reply? It seems true that in everyday
speech we move readily and without much sense of logical
impropriety from the statement that we have a basic need for
freedom to the assertion that we have a right to it. The appeal of
Gewirth's argument lies in its evocation of this familiar pattern of
thought. The question is whether the inference succeeds only by
tacitly relying on additional premises. If so, and if such premises do
not command our automatic assent as actors, then Gewirth's
argument fails by its own exacting standards of rational necessity.

6
7

After Virtue, supra note 3, 66-67.
Human Rights, supra note 2, 48-51.
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Of course this does not mean that the argument, suitably altered and
fleshed out, might not succeed by some other standards.
Does the argument tacitly appeal to hidden premises? I think it does.
Consider the following example. You are hiking through the
mountains of a remote area in the dead of winter. As you make your
way down a valley, you glance at the masses of snow poised in the
peaks above and wonder about the potential for an avalanche. Is that
a rumble you hear in the distance? Despite your rising unease and
the obvious fact that an avalanche would (as it were) impact
adversely on your generic rights, you would presumably not consider
claiming that you have a right as against the snow not to be buried
alive. Your acceptance of the statement 'I must have a measure of
freedom and well-being' does not logically require you to claim that
the massed snow 'must' respect your generic goods. It only warrants
the statement that the snow's remaining in place is an essential
precondition for your continuing existence as an agent. The reason
seems to be that the snow is not capable of acting in the light of
rational considerations.
So before your assertion of a need for generic goods can logically
entail a claim of right as against others, it must be supplemented by
premises about the character of the other beings in question. At the
least, you must posit that they are capable of reasoned action. In itself
this point is not damaging to Gewirth's argument, which explicitly
limits an agent’s claim to other beings of this type.8 Nevertheless, it
raises the question why it is essential that an entity have the capacity
for reasoned action before you can claim a right against it. Otherwise
this limitation on your assertion of rights would be irrational, and
you would logically be required to advance the same claim against
inanimate objects as you do against people. There must be some
close link between the concept of a right and the capacity for
reasoned action.

See, e.g., Reason and Morality, supra note 2, 72: “He claims as his prudential
due certain general goods that every other prospective agent can likewise
recognize as necessary for his respective agency.” (emphasis added)
8
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The link seems to be that a right only exists when it give others a
good reason to respect the claim it embodies.9 Thus, your assertion
of a need for generic goods logically requires you to claim a right
against others only on the supposition that the character of your
needs gives others a good reason to respect them. Now, the fact that
freedom and well-being are essential preconditions of your capacity
for action clearly gives you a good reason to hope or wish that others
will respect your generic goods, but it does not warrant the belief that
what is a good reason for you is necessarily a good reason for others.
Your basic need for freedom and well-being can supply a good
reason for others only on the supposition that they have some
concern for your welfare or are otherwise bound to take it into
account. This is as true from the internal perspective of the claimant
as it is from an external one. Adopting the internal perspective does
not require you to blind yourself to the character of the entities you
are making claims against.
Suppose, for example, that the mountains are inhabited by a
reclusive group of people who are hostile to outsiders and do their
best to repel them by all means at their disposal, including triggering
avalanches. Because of their history of maltreatment at the hands of
foreign invaders, these people have no sympathy with outsiders nor
concern for their welfare. In what way would your need for generic
goods justify you in claiming that they are obliged to respect your
freedom and well-being? The inference is only justified, it seems, on
the assumption that there is a minimal sympathy, community, or
state of reciprocity between you and these people, in the light of
which your claim to basic needs gives the latter reason to respect
them. It is only because we tacitly assume this holds true of other
members of our own society that we feel comfortable in moving
from assertions of basic needs to assertions of rights.
So Gewirth's argument requires an additional premise. This holds
that all other human beings are in a state of community with us, such
that they are obliged to respect the goods necessary for our existence

9

Compare Neil MacCormick 'Gewirth's Fallacy' (1983-84) 9 Queen's LJ 345.
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as actors.10 But there is nothing in our understanding of ourselves as
potential actors that seems to require or justify this assertion. So
Gewirth's argument fails by its own standards. Of course, if we are
prepared to accept on other grounds that all human beings form a
single community, then the argument may succeed in another form.
But let us now waive this objection and grant Gewirth his proposition
that, from within the internal perspective of the claimant, the
assertion of a basic need logically entails the assertion of a right as
against other people. The question is whether this proposition is
sufficient to generate Gewirth's conclusion that we are bound to
recognize that other people have rights against us.
Here a new difficulty arises. The move from an assertion of need to
one of right is only logical, on Gewirth's own account, from within
the claimant's internal perspective. From an external perspective, as
noted earlier, there is a logical gap. So, when we universalize the
inference from need to right that we draw internally, the most we are
committed to holding is that from within the internal perspective of
others their assertion of basic needs logically requires them to assert
rights against us.
But our insight into the internal logic of other people's claims does
not give those claims any purchase on us or require us to concede
that they actually impose obligations on us. Gewirth has only shown
that, by reflecting on the internal logic of our own claims, we may
come to understand the internal logic of similar claims made by
others. However such claims, as Gewirth concedes, are not logically
justified when seen from the external perspective. Yet this is the
perspective we are bound to take with others, unless our insight into
their minds evokes a pre-existing recognition of community or itself
prompts that recognition.
This analysis of Gewirth's argument, then, supports a central
conclusion drawn from our discussion of Coles's story. Human rights
10

Gewirth discusses a similar objection in Reason and Morality, supra note 2, 72,
74-75, however his treatment of the subject skirts the main issue.
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cannot be derived simply from philosophical reflection on the
characteristics of the individual considered apart from society.
Human rights are bound up with the recognition that people are in a
state of community, which is to say that they are united by a moral
bond requiring each to respect the other. For an argument like
Gewirth's to succeed, it has to add premises about the existence of
human community and show how these premises can be rationally
grounded. Such an enterprise must overcome two related obstacles.
The first is to establish that a state of community is even possible,
that people can in certain circumstances be morally bound by mutual
duties of respect. The second is to show that this community of
mutual respect is both actual and universal, that it includes all
human beings.
We will return to these questions later. But first it will be useful to
examine MacIntyre's second criticism of Gewirth. This queries the
degree to which Gewirth's argument can be successfully detached
from the unique social and intellectual context of modern Western
societies.
Macintyre's argument runs as follows. Claims to rights presuppose
the existence of a socially established set of rules. But such sets of
rules only come into existence at particular historical periods under
particular social circumstances; they are far from being universal.
Terms for 'a right' in English and other languages only appeared at a
relatively late period in history, near the close of the middle ages.
There is no equivalent expression in any ancient or medieval
language, be it Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Arabic, English, or Japanese.
True, the existence of such expressions is not in itself necessary for
rights to exist, so long as the concept of a right is actually embodied
in forms of human behaviour. However, as a matter of historical fact,
the social institutions or practices necessary to render a claim to a
right intelligible have not existed in all human societies. In the
absence of such social forms, laying claim to a right would be like
presenting a check for payment in a social order that lacked the
institution of money. Thus, Gewirth has smuggled into his argument
a concept that does not belong to the minimal characterization of a
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rational agent, but stems from social forms particular to modern
Western societies.11
Does MacIntyre's argument succeed? I think it fails, and the reasons
for its failure tell us much about the deficiencies of MacIntyre's own
understanding of human rights doctrines. Let us suppose, for the sake
of argument, that MacIntyre is correct in contending that there was
no word for 'a right' in many ancient and medieval languages. 12 As
he concedes, it does not follow that speakers of these languages
lacked the means of conceptualizing or expressing the moral and
legal relationships that the modern term 'right' evokes. What
MacIntyre does not seem to realize is how ubiquitous such
relationships are. Far from being unique to modern Western
societies, they lie at the root of societies as such.
The question of what rights a person possesses is at base the question
of what is due to that person. As Simone Weil has observed: 'The
notion of obligations comes before that of rights, which is
subordinate and relative to the former.'13 Although the concept of a
'right' is a convenient way of expressing what is due to a person from
that person's point of view, it is hardly essential to an understanding
of the underlying structure of an obligation. What is common to the
notions of right and obligation alike is the concept of a bond between
people by virtue of which one owes something to the other. Binding
moral or legal relationships and their concrete embodiments in social
life are of course hardly confined to modern societies; they are found
in all societies, however small or loosely structured. 14
So, if we are entitled to use the notion of a binding moral
relationship, we are entitled to use the notion of a right. The point is
11

After Virtue, supra note 3, 67-68, 69.
For helpful discussions, see John Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980) 198-210; Fred Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights
in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), especially Chapter 4.
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the mirror twin of the one made earlier in discussing Gewirth. There
we argued that the existence of rights presupposes the existence of a
community; here we argue that the existence of a community
presupposes the existence of rights. Of course, to note that the
concept of a binding relationship is an essential precondition for the
existence of a community is not to show that the concept has a
rational foundation, as opposed, for example, to one arising from
evolutionary advantage. It is yet another task to establish on purely
rational grounds that such relationships unite the whole of humanity,
quite apart from existing social practices.
If we doubt, along with MacIntyre, that human rights can ever be
rationally established simply by reflection on some features of the
human constitution, we are left to wonder if there can be any rational
foundation for these rights at all. MacIntyre, characteristically, does
not shrink from a flatly negative conclusion. The best reason, he
writes, for asserting that there are no such things as human rights is
the same as the best reason for saying that there are no witches or
unicorns: every attempt to give good reasons for believing in them
has failed. Some philosophers, he notes, have asserted that natural
rights are self-evident truths; but we know that there are no selfevident truths. Other philosophers have appealed to their own
intuitions and the intuitions of others, but the resort to intuition
invariably betrays that something has gone seriously wrong with the
argument. Natural or human rights, he concludes, are simply
fictions.15
These are sweeping statements, which MacIntyre does not seriously
attempt to substantiate. The reader may well think there is more to
intuition than MacIntyre is prepared to concede, and that it is at least
odd that MacIntyre takes it as self-evident that there are no selfevident truths. The main interest of MacIntyre's broadside, however,
lies in the assertion that we should not believe in human rights in the
absence of good reasons for believing in them. This raises the
question of what kinds of reasons count as 'good reasons,' and
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whether they are necessarily confined to the sort that philosophers
like Gewirth have attempted to supply.
I believe that our acceptance of universal human rights may be
justified in another way, one that appeals to the communal practices
and traditions within which doctrines of human rights have evolved
historically, and to the virtues of tolerance and respect that sustain
these practices. It is here that MacIntyre's own work becomes
particularly relevant, because it develops the view that traditions
have a rationality of their own, and that all rationality is in some
sense traditional. This indeed is the major thesis elaborated in Whose
Justice?. 16 That MacIntyre himself has used these ideas to attack
what he takes to be the unfounded premises of human rights and
liberalism only shows the extent to which MacIntyre (like many
others) has misunderstood the historical groundings of those
doctrines and their true character. Let us take a closer look at his
views.
The practice of human rights
MacIntyre is at pains to argue that in modern society there is no
rational way to resolve many moral disputes because the opposing
sides proceed from premises that are conceptually incommensurable.
At one stage, he illustrates his point by supplying three
'incommensurable' arguments addressing the question of abortion.17
It is worth pausing to consider these arguments here, because they
tell us much about MacIntyre's own grasp of human rights. They run
as follows:
(1) Everybody has certain rights over his or her own person,
including his or her own body. It follows from the nature of
these rights that at the stage when the embryo is essentially
part of the mother's body, the mother has a right to make her
own uncoerced decision on whether she will have an abortion
16
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or not. Therefore abortion is morally permissible and ought
to be allowed by law.
(2) I cannot will that my mother should have had an abortion
when she was pregnant with me, except perhaps if it had been
certain that the embryo was dead or gravely damaged. But if
I cannot will this in my own case, how can I consistently deny
to others the right to life that I claim for myself? I would
break the so-called Golden Rule unless I denied that a mother
has in general a right to an abortion. I am not of course
thereby committed to the view that abortion ought to be
legally prohibited.
(3) Murder is wrong. Murder is the taking of innocent life. An
embryo is an identifiable individual, differing from a
newborn infant only in being at an earlier stage on the long
road to adult capacities and, if any life is innocent, that of an
embryo is. If infanticide is murder, as it is, abortion is
murder. So abortion is not only morally wrong, but ought to
be legally prohibited.
MacIntyre suggests that debate between these viewpoints is
interminable in modern society. Although all three arguments follow
logically from their premises, the premises themselves employ
different normative concepts, and we have no established means of
deciding between them. At this level, we are reduced to assertion and
counter-assertion. The reason, MacIntyre says, is that we lack a
coherent body of theory and practice in terms of which the arguments
can be assessed. Instead we have inherited an ill-assorted miscellany
of arguments representing fragments of a range of moral traditions,
detached from the detailed historical contexts in which they
originally made sense. Thus, in the abortion debate 'a concept of
rights which has Lockean antecedents is matched against a view of
universalizability which is recognizably Kantian and an appeal to the
moral law which is Thomist'.18
MacIntyre is obviously right in observing that the abortion debate is
as yet unresolved in contemporary society. But his explanation of
18
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that fact is open to doubt. It is far from clear that the premises in the
three arguments are conceptually incommensurable; to the contrary,
they can all be translated into a common language of rights and
obligations, a fact to which MacIntyre's antipathy to rights seems to
blind him.
The first argument is, of course, already framed in terms of rights; it
proceeds from the premise that every person, including a pregnant
woman, has certain rights over her own body. What is striking about
this argument is that it ignores or discounts the possibility that the
fetus has rights of its own as against the pregnant woman, in effect
denying that there is any significant moral bond between woman and
fetus.
Moving down to the third argument, we can see that it takes the
converse tack; it assumes that the fetus has the same rights as a
newborn infant and concludes that the mother has a duty not to harm
or kill it. So doing, it dismisses or overlooks the possibility that, at
least at certain stages, a fetus may not have the same moral status
and rights as an infant and so may not stand to benefit from the rule
against murder.
The second argument asserts that since I must claim that, as a fetus,
I possessed certain rights against my mother, I must necessarily grant
to human fetuses in general the same rights as against their mothers.
Here again, the argument skirts the troubling question of the status
of the human fetus and the question whether it can be considered a
rights-bearer. All three arguments, then, can be stated adequately in
terms of rights and obligations; their essential differences concern
the way in which they characterize the moral status and rights of the
human fetus.
Moreover, all three sets of premises, far from being the flotsam and
jetsam of differing historical traditions, draw their strength from
thriving and reasonably coherent bodies of contemporary moral
practice, where the governing principles are in large part settled and
undisputed. Thus, the principle 'everybody has certain rights over his
or her own person, including his or her own body,' used in the first
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argument, lies at the root of substantial portions of the criminal law
and the law of torts. Likewise, the 'Golden Rule,' deployed in the
second argument, permeates much of our everyday moral reasoning.
Even young children understand the force of the question, 'How
would you like it if someone did that to you?' Finally, the principle
'murder is wrong; murder is the taking of innocent life' is considered
one of our most fundamental rules and not open to question. What is
open to question is the extent to which these various principles apply
to the matter of terminating a pregnancy (or, on another view,
terminating a fetus's life), for this does not clearly fall within one or
other of the spheres within which these principles have their
accepted and unproblematic operation. The reason is that as a society
we have not yet come to any settled view on the status of a fetus or
the stages marking its transition to full personhood.
Rather than illustrating the incommensurability of different moral
schemes competing for our allegiance, MacIntyre's example shows
only that our shared moral practices are complex and somewhat
untidy, and resist being displayed as a comprehensive and fully
consistent deductive system. In this respect modern societies are not
unique, although that fact is sometimes disguised by historians and
anthropologists anxious to vest the moral codes of remote societies
with a shining rigour and consistency hardly compatible with the
ambiguities and complexities of human social life.
The true position seems to be as follows. There are large areas of our
lives where the governing moral principles are reasonably wellknown and accepted. We could hardly live from day to day were this
not the case. These sets of principles are somewhat diverse, and their
relations with one another are often unclear. If generalized beyond
their established spheres of application, they would sometimes
dictate conflicting courses of action. But usually they do not have
this effect, because their operation is confined within separate and
relatively well-defined areas of practical decision-making. However
there are matters that do not fall clearly within one or another sphere,
or whose formerly secure position within a certain sphere has
become precarious. Consider the case of animals, once classified
virtually as 'quasi-things' but now increasingly viewed as entities
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meriting regard in their own right. In such contentious cases, debate
often centres on the extent to which the matter in question resembles
or differs from the subjects of settled spheres of practice – in this
instance, how far animals resemble or differ from human beings on
the one hand, and mere things on the other. The question is only
resolved once it becomes clear what the character of the matter under
dispute 'really is,' that is, its relationship to the subjects of existing
bodies of practice and the standards that inform them.
So, presumably, the debate over abortion will continue so long as
people cannot agree whether human fetuses are closer in nature to
infants or to masses of organized tissue appended to a woman's body,
or whether they occupy some unique intermediate status. The fact
that, in recent times, we have not been able to come to substantial
agreement on the issue does not mean that we will not succeed in the
future. At any rate, it is sufficient for our purposes to point out that
the question, which concerns the possible existence and nature of a
moral bond between mother and fetus, can be understood without
distortion as raising questions of the scope and application of basic
human rights.
On this view, moral reasoning is similar to reasoning carried on in
common law systems, where courts make practical decisions within
a context formed by sprawling bodies of judicial precedents that are
organized roughly in subject areas, with intricate internal links and
oppositions. The precedents and the principles and rules they secrete
are largely accepted on authority, but they are always open to
revision and development, usually in the light of standards already
implicit in existing strands of precedents. The rationality of a
particular decision, such as it is, flows from the rationality of the
system as a whole, which in turn rests on its ability to resolve justly
most of the specific questions that are put to it.
The lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that issues of human
rights, like other moral issues, arise and find their resolution within
the context of a living moral tradition, with its recognized spheres of
practice, and the internal goods, virtues, rules, and basic standards
that they support. It seems unlikely that the question of what is due
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to people as such (and which beings qualify for human status) can be
answered on the one hand simply by logical deduction from selfevident first principles, or on the other hand by intuitive processes
uninformed by social practice. The question is only capable of being
grasped, much less answered, by virtue of the formative influences
and resources offered by an ongoing moral tradition. The general
point is, of course, one that MacIntyre has elaborated with such
insight.19 It is only his antagonism to the notion of universal human
rights that prevents him from seeing how fruitfully it may be applied
in this sphere.
But this view may seem paradoxical. How can universal human
rights, which are said to apply to all persons regardless of their
particular features, society, religion, and so on, be rationally
grounded in a moral tradition which is local and particular? This
question lies at the root of MacIntyre's unease with human rights.
Consider the following passage from Whose Justice?, which
reiterates a theme woven into much of the discussion:20
The conclusion to which the argument so far has led is not
only that it is out of the debates, conflict, and enquiry of
socially embodied, historically contingent traditions that
contentions regarding practical rationality and justice are
advanced, modified, abandoned, or replaced, but that there is
no other way to engage in the formulation, elaboration,
rational justification, and criticism of accounts of practical
rationality and justice except from within some one particular
tradition in conversation, cooperation, and conflict with those
who inhabit the same tradition. There is no standing ground,
no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of
advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned
argument apart from that which is provided by some
particular tradition or other.
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Does it follow that universal human rights are an impossibility, at
least in the absence of a single moral tradition uniting the whole of
humanity? The question requires us to distinguish four propositions,
which are easily confused:
(1) moral reasoning, including reasoning about human rights,
necessarily draws upon a particular moral tradition and body
of social practice;
(2) moral reasoning is necessarily limited in application to
fellow participants in the tradition or society that nurtures
the reasoning;
(3) moral rights and obligations are necessarily justified by
reference to socially attributed roles and statuses embodied
in the practices of particular communities; they cannot be
justified by reference to characteristics ostensibly held by
people apart from their membership in any actual
community; and
(4) moral reasoning has persuasive force for others only to the
extent to which they inhabit the same moral tradition.
The first point concerns the origins of moral reasoning, the second
its scope of application, the third its mode of justification, and the
fourth its persuasive force.
The first proposition, as we have argued above, is clearly right.
Moral issues, including those concerning human rights, arise and are
resolved within a living moral tradition, with its recognized spheres
of practice, and the internal goods, virtues, rules, and principles they
harbour. What follows from accepting it? Does it commit us to the
other three propositions, which cast doubt on the possibility of
universal human rights?
The answer is surely negative. There is no reason in principle why a
moral argument may not (1) draw upon traditions and practices
particular to a certain society, and at the same time, where
appropriate, (2) strive for universality in its scope of application, (3)
justify its tenets by reference to grounds or factors that prescind from
the features of particular individuals and their roles in actual
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communities, and (4) have persuasive force for the inhabitants of
other moral traditions.
I cannot deal fully with these points here, and will limit myself to
brief comments on each. It is clear, first of all, that when we reason
about human rights we are drawing on a long and complex heritage
of practice and reasoning, as conducted within a particular moral
tradition or set of traditions. Let it be noted that this heritage has been
hard won. Rooted in protracted historical struggles, the practice of
human rights is not the wan and thin-skinned fruit of intellectual
hothouses but the tough and scarred product of soil drenched with
blood. In apparent innocence, MacIntyre remarks: 'In the United
Nations declaration on human rights of 1949 what has since become
the normal UN practice of not giving good reasons for any assertions
whatsoever is followed with great rigor'. 21 Witty but somehow
witless, this remark is striking in its disregard of the historical
experience from which the UN declaration sprang, as if the
experience of Nazism and the Holocaust could not stand as good
reason for anything. Here, as elsewhere, MacIntyre's error is one of
not learning his own lessons well enough.
To address the second point, the fact that human rights reasoning
springs from a particular tradition does not inevitably undermine its
claim to universal scope. That Jane Austen spent her life within the
confines of a small and relatively secluded sector of English society
does not necessarily detract from the universality of her insights into
human character. The fact that most modern scientists work within a
well-defined tradition of enquiry, which is incompatible with other
traditions such as the magical and astrological, is not in itself a
sufficient ground for doubting the universal application of their
theories. Nevertheless, here as elsewhere, our awareness of the local
origins of human rights reasoning should induce a measure of
humility and openness in approaching other moral traditions and
cultures. Missionaries of human rights can be no less rigid and
uncomprehending than their religious predecessors.
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As for the third point, it is true that a large and important part of
everyday morality is justified by reference to socially attributed
roles. At every turn in daily life, we are guided by complex ranges
of responsibilities implicit in our various roles as parents, children,
spouses, relatives, neighbours, friends, citizens, teachers, students,
employers, employees, and so forth. Reasoning about human rights
draws heavily on our reflections on the nature and basis of our actual
obligations to others, obligations that have assumed a widely
differing character in different societies. But moral reasoning is not
limited to the actual practices of our own society; in the end it is
concerned with the practices of the ideal society. Our knowledge of
the ideal is gained through familiarity with the actual, but moves
beyond it.
MacIntyre aptly describes this process in his discussion of
Aristotle:22
The justice of which Aristotle offers an account ... exhibits
justice-as-it-ought-to-be-understood as implicit in the practice
of justice-as-it-is. The justice of actual poleis is held to be in
varying ways defective, but it is in studying the principles
implicit in those varying forms that we discern how those
defects are all departures from or failures to achieve a form of
justice which would be the best justice of the best kind of polis.
Reasoning about human rights is directed at determining what is due
to people living in the ideally just community, given the potential
implicit in human nature. It does not seek to supplant the moral
knowledge derived from the practices of our own community, but to
supplement and transform it. The ideal community envisaged by
human rights doctrines is ultimately a universal one, encompassing
the whole of humanity, although not one that ousts local forms of
community. Experience with the polis has shown its inadequacy as
the sole matrix for moral endeavour and development. If this was not
obvious to Aristotle, it should now be obvious to us.
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As for the final point, the persuasive force of moral principles and
practices is not always limited by their local origins, as the course of
human history reminds us. Prophets live in particular times and
places, yet they may speak to distant ears. In various ways, the
examples set by Gandhi, Norman Bethune, and Julius Nyerere have
reached far beyond their home provinces. Whatever the local roots
of the doctrines and practices of human rights, it is clear that they
have slowly been transforming not only the societies of Western
Europe and the Americas but also, at varying paces and in different
ways, those of Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
There is reason to think that the process is accelerating and
deepening rather than slackening off.
Epilogue
Practice and tradition help explain the process by which reasoning
about human rights is carried on. However, they do not go far to
show the underlying dynamic. Human rights represent, I think, the
gradual unfolding of the meaning and requirements of commitments
to certain basic values or goods that are experienced as lying beyond
the practices where they are first encountered. There are, of course,
many such goods, but one in particular seems worthy of emphasis:
the value of friendship and the role that it plays in bringing home to
us the intrinsic worth of others. Through our concern for the welfare
of our friends, coupled with the practice of simple forms of courtesy
and respect, we come to realize the importance of a basic level of
concern for people in general.
The point may be illustrated, once again, by a story related by Robert
Coles. The story concerns a nine-year-old boy from the slums of Rio
de Janeiro, the 'favelas.' Like many other children, this boy went
every day to the oceanside boulevard of Copacabana to hustle for the
privilege of washing the cars of the rich. Here are the boy's
reflections on his experiences:
'I do not hold it against them; I know they did not arrange Rio
to be the way it is before they were born here! I know I didn't
arrange things either! It's the luck of the draw! My luck is
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bad; theirs is good – the kids I see coming out of the big
hotels and apartment houses in Copacabana and Ipanema. I
talked with one boy last week – he stared at me, and I stared
back. He had a suit on: poor kid. It was a summer suit, but he
looked hot. I guess he was upset that the air conditioning
stopped when he left the lobby of the building. Even the rich
have to sweat sometimes! He was very nice to me: he asked
me how I was doing. He had been watching me from the
window of his apartment before he came down, to wait for
the driver to take him to his father's office. He said he thought
I was very strong, the way I worked so fast on the cars. He
said he'd tell his father to pay me to do their cars. I asked how
many they have. He said three.
'Then one of them came, a Mercedes: rich! The doorman tells
me in our country a Mercedes costs four times what it costs
in other countries, because of taxes. But he said "these
people, they can afford anything, and it doesn't bother them
to pay lots of money." He said, "if they buy something cheap,
they don't believe it's any good!" I'd love to be in their shoes,
but it's not my luck. They sure don't want to be in my shoes!
But that kid, I think he was curious, and I was very glad to
speak with him. I thanked him for the job suggestion, and he
was very polite; he thanked me for offering to do the job!
Thank you, thank you, we were saying to each other, over
and over – just two kids, not "us" up here in the favela and
"them" over there in Copacabana!'23
A small story about a trivial incident. But how incomparably richer
and more suggestive it is than our best attempts at theorizing.
Bringing philosophy to bear on human experience is like fishing with
a large-meshed net. Only the big and clumsy are snagged; the small
and quick escape. And the ocean itself drains unnoticed through the
strands.
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